DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 1997-149 
 
 
   

 

 
 

FINAL DECISION 

 
ANDREWS, Attorney-Advisor: 
 
 
This  proceeding  was  conducted  according  to  the  provisions  of  section 
1552 of title 10 of the United States Code.  It was commenced upon the BCMR’s 
receipt of the applicant’s application on July 7, 1997. 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  February  25,  1999,  is  signed  by  the three  duly 

RELIEF REQUESTED 

 
The applicant is a retired xxxxxxxxxxxxx who served more than 20 years 
 
in the federal civil service and on inactive duty in the Coast Guard Reserve, and 
more than six years of active duty service.  In September 199x, he canceled his 
temporary active duty contract (almost two years remained) to accept a xx-year 
civil  service  contract,  because  he  wanted  to  join  the  Senior  Executive  Service 
(SES).   
 

The applicant asked the Board to change his Coast Guard record to show 
that  he  did  not  cancel  his  active  duty  contract  and  that  he  remained  on  active 
duty until his contract ended on July 12, 199x.  The change would add almost 
two  years  to the  applicant’s  active  duty  service  and  allow  him  to  receive  back 
pay and allowances from the Coast Guard offset by his civilian salary.  He might 
also  receive  between  $60,000  and  $70,000  in  Civil  Service  Retirement  System 
(CSRS)  annuity  payments,  which  were  offset  when  he  left  active  duty  and 
rejoined the civil service from September 27, 199x, to July 12, 199x. 
 

APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant stated that in June 198x he had been recalled to active duty 
after  more  than  20  years  working  in  the  federal  civil  service  while  on  inactive 
duty in the Coast Guard Reserve.  While serving on his active duty contract, he 
received a CSRS pension of approximately $35,000 per year.  While still on active 
duty in 199x, he applied for the SES Development Program.  The applicant stated 
that he was then unaware that it was for civilian employees only.  When selected 
for  the  program,  he  was  advised  that  he  would  have  to  become  a  civilian 
employee  to  continue.    At  the time,  he  still had  almost  two  years  to go  on  his 
active duty contract.  
 
 
The  applicant  alleged  that  on  active  duty  he  was  earning  about  $85,000 
per year plus his civil service annuity of $30,000.  After joining the SES, he would 
earn  about  $80,000,1  and  the  annuity  would  be  offset.    Therefore,  he  would 
receive  between  $30,000  and  $35,000  less  per  year  in  the  SES.    The  applicant 
alleged that he chose to rejoin the civil service, however, because he was advised 
by  Coast  Guard  personnel  that  his  active  duty  years  would  count  toward  his 
CSRS annuity computation.  The increased annuity he thought he would receive 
after  he  re-retired  from  civil  service,  he  alleged,  would  have  made  up  for  the 
short-term, two-year loss of his annuity payments in about four years. 
 

The  applicant  qualified  for  the  SES  but  did  not  receive  an  appointment 
before his temporary civil service contract ended in 199x.  The applicant alleged 
that he has now been told by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that 
“the  active  duty  period  cannot  be  included  in  the  civil  service  computation 
unless there is a ‘new period of entitlement’ established.  Such a ‘new period of 
entitlement’  requires  five  additional  years  of  civilian  service.”    Therefore,  the 
applicant’s  active  duty  service  is  not  included  in  the  computation  of  his  CSRS 
annuity even though Coast Guard personnel had told him it would be. 
 
 
The applicant stated that the Coast Guard’s erroneous advice had induced 
him  to  leave  the  service  almost  two  years  early  and  thereby  to  lose  between 
$60,000 and $70,000 in CSRS annuity payments.  Since OPM will not include his 
active duty time in his CSRS annuity computation, he asked the Board to change 
his discharge date so that he would be restored to the same financial position he 
would have been in  had he not acted on the erroneous advice of Coast Guard 
personnel specialists.  
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

                                                 
1      The  Chief  Counsel  stated  that  the  applicant’s  compensation  as  a  civil  servant  was 
approximately $88,000.  The applicant did not dispute this but stated that the exact amount of his 
salary is irrelevant to the main issues in his case. 

 
 
On January 15, 1999, the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard submitted an 
advisory opinion in which he recommended that the Board deny the applicant’s 
request. 
 

First, the Chief Counsel argued there is no error in the applicant’s record 
for the Board to correct.  The applicant’s DD Form 214 reflects his true date of 
separation from active duty. 

 
Second,  the  Chief  Counsel  argued  that  the  applicant  “is  estopped  from 
asserting  any  reliance  claim  based  on  the  inaccurate  advice  .  .  .  .”    The  Chief 
Counsel  admitted  that  both  the  Civilian  Personnel  Branch  and  the  Office  of 
Military Personnel had wrongly advised the applicant as to the includability of 
his active duty service in the computation of his civil service annuity.  However,  
the Chief Counsel argued, in Montilla v. United States, 457 F.2d 978 (Ct. Cl. 1972),  

 
the Court of Claims held that the misrepresentations of officers of the U.S. 
Army  to  the  plaintiff,  leading  him  to  believe  that  he  had  completed 
twenty  years  of  active  military  service  and  was  thus  eligible  for  retire-
ment pay upon reaching age sixty, could not alter the fact that the plain-
tiff  had  not  actually  completed  twenty  years  of  active  service  as  com-
puted  under  10  U.S.C.  § 1332  (1964).    The  Montilla  court  reasoned  that 
unless a law has been repealed or declared unconstitutional by the courts, 
it is a part of the supreme law of the land and no officer or agency can by 
his actions or conduct waive its provisions or nullify its enforcement. 457 
F.2d at 987. 
 
The  Chief  Counsel  also  quoted  the  following  passage  from  Goldberg  v. 
Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Goldberg v. Califano, 
431 U.S. 937 (1977): 

 
The  government  could  scarcely  function  if  it  were  bound  by  its 
employees  unauthorized  representations. 
  Where  a  party  claims 
entitlement to benefits under federal statutes and lawfully promulgated 
regulations,  that  party  must  satisfy  the  requirements  imposed  by 
Congress.  Even detrimental reliance on misinformation obtained from a 
seemingly  authorized  government  agency  will  not  excuse  a  failure  to 
qualify for the benefits under the relevant statutes and regulations.  Id. at 
481. 
 
Finally,  the  Chief  Counsel  argued  that  the  applicant  has  failed  to  prove 

that an injustice occurred: 

 
Applicant is a seasoned veteran of the military and the civil service with 
over 30 years of combined federal service. . . .  [H]e decided to voluntarily 

sever his [temporary active duty] contract with the Coast Guard in order 
to participate in an Executive Development program designed to prepare 
candidates for selection to SES grade. 
 
Applicant now wishes us to believe that he took this action based solely 
on the supposed inaccurate advice he received regarding his future CSRS 
benefits.  What Applicant fails to point out is that no one forced him to 
seek  this  opportunity  and  he  may  very  well  have  made  the  very  same 
decision to leave active-duty even if he had received the correct informa-
tion.    Apparently  Applicant  never  achieved  his  goal  of  attaining  SES 
grade.  However, had he been . . . promoted to the SES grade, the Appli-
cant would have received substantial financial and status benefits above 
his  then  current  benefits  and  status.    His  voluntary  choice  to  seek 
“greener  pastures”  is  neither an  error  nor injustice.   This  application  to 
“correct his record” sounds more like a claim against the government for 
monetary damages than a request for a military record correction. . . .  No 
error to his record has been proved. 
 
Moreover, the burden or risk of accuracy in determining pay entitlements 
between federal and military service falls appropriately on the benefici-
ary. . . .  No matter what advice he received regarding his future CSRS 
benefits, he is responsible for determining his own retirement benefits. 

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
On January 19, 1999, the Chairman of the BCMR sent a copy of the Chief 
 
Counsel’s  advisory  opinion  to  the  applicant  and  invited  him  to  respond.    On 
January 26, 1999, the applicant responded.   
 
 
The  applicant  explained  that,  although  he  had  in  fact  qualified  for 
appointment in the SES, he did not enter it because there were no SES positions 
available within the Department of xxxxx prior to the expiration of his xx-year 
temporary  civil  service  appointment  in  199x.    However,  he  stated  that  his 
decision to end his active duty contract with the Coast Guard was based not on 
his  SES  aspirations  but  on  the  monetary  incentive  shown  him  by  the  Coast 
Guard’s  erroneous advice. 
 
 
The  applicant  stated  that  he  has  no  recourse  through  OPM.    “OPM  is 
bound by the statute and we are unaware of any OPM forum that can “remove 
injustice” comparable to Congress’s grant of authority to the BCMRs . . . under 10 
U.S.C. § 1552.”  He cited Duhon v. United States, 461 F.2d 1278, 1281 (Ct. Cl. 1972), 
Caddington  v.  United  States,  178  F.  Supp.  604,  607  (Ct.  Cl.  1959),  and  Thomas  v. 
Cheney, 925 F.2d 1407, 1423-24 (Fed. Cir. 1991), for the proposition that the Board 
should restore him to where he would have been had he not relied on the Coast 
Guard’s erroneous advice. 

 
 
The applicant further stated that he has never held a “personnel” position 
and had no way to know that the advice he received was incorrect.  “Whether or 
not  the  incorrect  advice  they  furnished  conferred  on  [the  applicant]  a  right 
enforceable  at  law  (and  we  do  not  contend  it  is  enforceable  under  the  Tucker 
Act), his reliance on their written representation . . . was entirely reasonable.” 
 
 
following: 
 

Regarding the Board’s jurisdiction over the case, the applicant stated the 

The Board’s jurisdiction is both broad and remedial in character, Kalista v. 
Sec’y of the Navy, 560 F. Supp. 608, 611 (D. Colo. 1983);  Oleson v. United 
States, 172 Ct. Cl. 9 (1965); 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 504 (1947), and there can be 
no question that correction of [the applicant’s] records is within its reach. 
. . .  [The applicant] does not contend that his case falls within the “error” 
part of the Board’s authority, but rather, that it falls within the “injustice” 
part.  The [cases cited by the Coast Guard] stand for the proposition that a 
court will not enforce an incorrect representation by a government offi-
cial.    This  case  does  not  seek  such  relief,  but  seeks  simply  to  put  [the 
applicant]  back  where  he  would  have  been  absent  the  incorrect 
information. 
 
Regarding the Coast Guard’s estoppel argument, the applicant stated as 

In June 198x, the applicant retired from the federal civil service with over 
22 years of creditable service.  In June 198x, the applicant agreed to be recalled to 
active duty and signed a x-year temporary active duty contract. 

 
In 199x, the applicant applied to the xxx Executive Development Program.  
After being accepted by the program, but prior to entering, the applicant sought 
advice from the Coast Guard Civilian Personnel Branch regarding how rejoining 
the  civil  service  would  affect  his  retirement  pay  under  the  Civil  Service 
Retirement System (CSRS).  According to the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, 
that branch determined that his active duty service could be included in his civil 
service computation but asked the Office of Military Personnel in the Personnel 

follows: 
 
The  Coast  Guard’s  suggestion  .  .  .  that  [the  applicant]  is  somehow 
“estopped from asserting” his own reliance reflects a misunderstanding 
of  the  doctrine  of  “estoppel.”    The  term  does  not  simply  mean  a  party 
cannot  prevail  on  some  particular  argument;  it  means  the  law  will  not 
hear the party to advance some point or other.  The doctrine has no appli-
cation [in this case]. 
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 

Management Directorate to confirm that fact.  Both the Civilian Personnel Branch 
and the Office of Military Personnel then erroneously informed the applicant as 
to the includability of his active duty service in the computation of his civil serv-
ice annuity.  

 
The  applicant  thereafter  sought  and  received  permission  to  cancel  his 
active duty contract.  On September 27, 199x, the applicant became a federal civil 
servant  again.    He  was  employed  by  the  Coast  Guard  on  a  xx-year  temporary 
civil service contract.  On March 3, 199x, the applicant received a computation of 
his  CSRS  annuity.    The  computation  showed  over  32  years  of  total  service, 
including his recent 5+ years of military service.  

 
On October 19, 199x, the applicant qualified to enter the SES.  He was cer-

tified for appointment to the SES for a period of three years from that date. 

 
On May 31, 199x, a Coast Guard Personnel Management Specialist wrote a 
letter to OPM, which stated that the applicant had made a $25,515.80 deposit to 
have his annuity recomputed upon his separation from active duty.  OPM was 
asked to recompute his annuity to reflect his additional service.  

 
On July 12, 199x, the applicant left the federal civil service upon the termi-

nation of his temporary contract. 

 
On  August  27,  199x,  another  Personnel  Management  Specialist  sent  the 

applicant a letter stating that OPM would calculate his supplemental annuity. 

 
On July 8, 199x, an OPM Benefits Specialist wrote a letter informing the 
applicant  that  his  active  duty  service  could  not  be  included  in  his  civil  service 
computation  unless  he  became  “reemployed  and  acquire[d]  a  new  retirement 
right.”  The $25,515.80 was refunded to him. 

 
On  July  23,  199x,  the  Commander  of  the  Coast  Guard  Personnel  Com-
mand wrote to the Chairman of the BCMR on the applicant’s behalf.  He stated 
as follows: 

 
[The  applicant’s]  transition  to  the  Coast  Guard  civilian  work  force  on 
9/27/9x was voluntary; however, he made this transition after receiving 
incorrect  information  provided  to  him  by  the  Coast  Guard  regarding 
potential retirement benefits.  I ask that you take this into account when 
reviewing this case. 
 

FEDERAL STATUTE (BCMR) 

 

 
According to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), “[t]he Secretary of a military depart-
ment  may  correct  any  military  record  of  the  Secretary’s  department  when  the 
Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 
 

FEDERAL CASE LAW 

 
Montilla v. United States, 457 F.2d 978 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 
 
 
Montilla  was  a  World  War  II  veteran  who  served  in  the  Army  Reserve 
after the war.  Because he was negligent in informing the Army of a change of 
address,  he  did  not  learn  for  many  years  that  between  1949  and  1952,  he  had 
been  transferred  to  the  Inactive  Reserve.    In  1952,  he  accepted  an  indefinite 
Active Reserve appointment.  In 1953, Montilla received a letter telling him that 
he had completed 20 years of service creditable in the computation of basic pay 
and that therefore he should inform the Army about whether he wanted to elect 
a certain annuity benefit.  The letter did not state that he had 20 years of service 
creditable in the computation of retirement pay, but Montilla assumed this was 
true.    In  1955,  Montilla  was  notified  that  he  was  to  be  assigned  to  an  Inactive 
Reserve unit.  He was concerned about the effect of this change on his retirement 
eligibility and sought the advice of a Senior Army Advisor.  He alleged that the 
advisor reviewed his record and told him that he did not need to be concerned 
because  he  had  already  completed  20  years  in  the  Active  Reserve.    Upon 
reaching  the  age  of  60,  Montilla  applied  for  retirement  pay,  but  it  was  denied 
because he had never completed 20 years service in the Active Reserve.  In 1966, 
he applied to the Army BCMR, which denied relief. 
 
 
The  U.S.  Claims  Court  upheld  the  BCMR’s  decision.    It  concluded  that, 
even if it assumed that Montilla’s allegations concerning his conversation with 
the Army advisor were true, no relief was due.  The Court quoted the following 
passage from Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947):  
 

Whatever the form in which government functions, anyone entering into 
an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately 
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within 
the bounds of his authority.  The scope of this authority my be explicitly 
defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exer-
cised through the rulemaking power. . . .  Just as everyone is charged with 
knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided 
that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives 
legal notice of their contents.  Id. at 384-85. 

 
Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.  

Goldberg v. Califano, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). 

 

 
Goldberg was a widow receiving Social Security survivor’s benefits when 
she considered remarrying and sought advice at a local Social Security office on 
how  remarrying  could  affect  her  benefits.    She  was  advised  that  the  benefits 
would be reduced but not stop altogether.  However, because Ms. Goldberg was 
under the age of 60 when she remarried, her survivor’s benefits were stopped. 
 
 
The Second Circuit upheld the Social Security Administration’s refusal to 
pay  the  survivor  benefits.    It  found  that  “[i]t  is  well  established  that  ‘estoppel 
cannot be set up against the Government on the basis of an unauthorized repre-
sentation or act of an officer or employee who is without authority in his indi-
vidual capacity to bind the Government.’” Id. at 481 (citations omitted). 
 
Kalista v. Secretary of the Navy, 560 F. Supp. 608 (D. Colo. 1983). 
 
 
Kalista received an “undesirable” discharge following civilian convictions 
and incarceration on several counts of breaking and entering.  His application to 
the  Navy  BCMR  was  denied.    In  describing  the  BCMR’s  statute,  the  District 
Court stated that the “legislation was remedial in nature and should be liberally 
construed.” Id. at 611. 
 
Caddington v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 604 (Ct. Cl. 1959). 
 
 
Caddington was a retired lieutenant colonel who had been recommended 
for promotion during World War II.  Before the promotion could be administra-
tively processed, however, Caddington was injured in the Pacific.  Because his 
records were lost, he was not promoted before being retired.  The Army BCMR 
ordered him promoted to colonel but denied him any increase in retirement pay.  
 
 
The Claims Court found that Caddington was due the retirement pay of a 
colonel as well as the promotion.  In describing the role of the BCMR, is stated, 
“We  feel  that  the  Secretary  and  his  boards  have  an  abiding  moral  sanction  to 
determine insofar as possible, the true nature of an alleged injustice and to take 
steps to grant thorough and fitting relief.” Id. at 607. 
 

Duhon v. United States, 461 F.2d 1278 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 
 
 
Duhon was a major in the Air Force Reserve.  The Air Force gave him a 
commission as a major in the regular Air Force after having wrongly calculated 
his promotion list service date and date of rank.  When the error was discovered, 
his regular commission was summarily revoked. The Air Force failed to advise 
Duhon of the various ways he might proceed to reestablish his career.  Because 
his Reserve commission had expired, he was forced to serve as an enlisted man 
for  several  years  in  order  to  receive retired  pay.    The  Air  Force  BCMR  denied 
Duhon request to promote him to major and grant him a major’s retired pay. 
 
 
The Claims Court found that the BCMR had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in denying Duhon’s request.  In doing so, it quoted its own statement in 
the Caddington decision (see above) regarding the “abiding moral sanction” of 
the BCMRs.  Id. at 1281. 
 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

 
 
The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of 
the applicant's military record and submissions, the Coast Guard's submissions, 
and applicable law: 
 

1. 

The Board has jurisdiction concerning this matter pursuant to sec-

tion 1552 of title 10 of the United States Code.  The application was timely. 
 

2. 

The  applicant  requested  an  oral  hearing  before  the  Board.    The 
Chairman,  acting  pursuant  to  33  CFR  52.31,  denied  the  request  and  recom-
mended  disposition  of  the  case  without  a  hearing.    The  Board  concurs  in  that 
recommendation. 

 
3. 

 
4. 

The  applicant  was  serving  on  an  active  duty  contract  when  he 
sought to join the SES.  After he was told that he would have to cancel his active 
duty contract to join the SES, he sought the advice of Coast Guard personnel spe-
cialists regarding the monetary consequences of such a move.  The Coast Guard 
informed the applicant that if he rejoined the civil service, the time served on his 
active duty contract would count in the computation of his CSRS annuity.  The 
Coast  Guard  failed  to  inform  the  applicant  that  this  would  only  be  true  if  he 
established a new period of entitlement by rejoining the federal civil service for 
at least five years.   

Based on the Coast Guard’s advice, the applicant determined that 
the income he would lose by rejoining the civil service and having his annuity 
payments offset until he retired again would be recouped within a few years of 

retirement because of the increase in his annuity caused by the inclusion of his 
years on active duty.  Therefore, the applicant canceled his active duty contract 
with  the  Coast  Guard  and  accepted  a  xx-year  temporary  civil  service  appoint-
ment.  The applicant qualified to be appointed to an SES position as of October 
19, 199x.  However, he was not appointed prior to the end of his temporary xx-
year  contract  in  199x.    Therefore,  the  applicant  retired  from  the  civil  service 
before  completing  the  five  years  that  would  have  constituted  a  new  period  of 
entitlement under OPM rules and permitted his active duty years to count in the 
computation of his CSRS annuity. 

If the applicant had stayed on active duty, he would have contin-
ued to receive his Coast Guard salary plus his CSRS annuity of approximately 
$35,000 annually for the next two years.  As a member of the civil service, his sal-
ary was similar to what he had received on active duty, but he did not receive his 
annuity.  Therefore, the move to the civil service apparently cost the applicant 
between $60,000 and $70,000.  

The government—whether in its Coast Guard or OPM manifesta-
tion—is not estopped from repudiating the wrong or insufficient advice of Coast 
Guard  benefit  specialists.  Goldberg  v.  Weinberger,  546  F.2d  477,  481  (2d  Cir. 
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Goldberg v. Califano, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Montilla v. 

 
5. 

 
6. 

 
7. 

 
8. 

The  applicant  stated  that  OPM  will  not  include  his  active  duty 
years in the computation of his CSRS annuity even though Coast Guard person-
nel specialists had informed him that it would and he had relied on their advice.  
He  submitted  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  an  OPM  Benefits  Specialist  dated  July  8, 
199x, that confirms his assertion.  Therefore, the applicant asked to be restored to 
the  same  financial  position  he  would  have  been  in  had  he  never  canceled  his 
active duty contract.  If his records were changed to show that he remained on 
active duty until the expiration of his contract, he would receive back pay and 
allowances minus any civil service salary he had received during that period.  In 
addition,  although  the  BCMR  has  no  control  over  OPM  records  and  CSRS 
annuity payments, the applicant apparently believes that OPM would then pay 
him the annuity payments he would have received had he actually continued on 
active duty through the end of his contract. 

The  Chief  Counsel  of  the  Coast  Guard  suggested  that  the  BCMR 
has no jurisdiction over this case because the applicant’s request is “more like a 
claim against the government for monetary damages than a request for a military 
record correction.”  However, the applicant has stated that he believes the date of 
discharge shown in his records is unjust.  The BCMR statute expressly authorizes 
the Board to “remove an injustice” from a military record.  10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1).  
Therefore, the Board finds that it does have jurisdiction over this case. 

United  States,  457  F.2d  978,  987  (Ct.  Cl.  1972).    However,  the  BCMR  has  “an 
abiding  moral  sanction  to  determine  insofar  as  possible,  the  true  nature  of  an 
alleged  injustice  and  to  take  steps  to  grant  thorough  and  fitting  relief.”  
Caddington v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 604, 607 (Ct. Cl. 1959).  Therefore, the 
Board  must  determine  whether  the  Coast  Guard,  in  wrongly  advising  the 
applicant, has committed such an injustice as to warrant the Board’s exercise of 
its “abiding moral sanction” to remove injustices in military records. 
 

The applicant voluntarily sought to rejoin the federal civil service, 
from which he was already receiving a CSRS annuity through OPM.  In asking a 
specialist  from  the  Coast  Guard  Civilian  Personnel  Branch  to  determine  what 
effect such a move would have on his annuity, he was asking the Coast Guard to 
interpret  OPM  regulations  for  him.    The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that 
“[w]hatever  the  form  in  which  government  functions,  anyone  entering  into  an 
arrangement  with  the  Government  takes  the  risk  of  having  accurately  ascer-
tained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds 
of  his  authority.”  Federal  Crop  Ins.  Corp.  v.  Merrill,  332  U.S.  380,  384  (1947).  
Therefore,  the  Board  finds  that  the  Coast  Guard’s  error  in  interpreting  OPM’s 
CSRS regulations did not constitute such an injustice as would justify granting 
the requested relief.  

 
10.  Accordingly, the applicant’s request should be denied.  

9. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES ON FOLLOWING PAGE] 

 
 

 

ORDER 

The  application  for  correction  of  the  military  record  of  XXXXXXXXX, 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 
Robert H. Joost 

 

        

 
Walter K. Myers 

 

 

 
Michael K. Nolan 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 
 

USCG, is hereby denied.